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Defining an “interlocutory application” 
 
OpenNet Pte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore 
[2013] SGCA 24 
 
 
CHUA HUI HAN EUNICE∗ 
 
With effect from 1 January 2011, the Supreme Court of Judicature Act1 (“the Act”) was 
amended to introduce a three-pronged approach aimed at “streamlining of appeals to the 
Court of Appeal arising from interlocutory applications”.2 Given that: (1) interlocutory 
applications are not likely to involve novel points of law and usually do not affect the 
substantive rights of the parties; (2) interlocutory applications are usually heard by a High 
Court Registrar and a party can appeal against the Registrar’s decision to a High Court 
Judge; and (3) a substantive action in a civil suit only enjoys one tier of appeal as of right, the 
amendments were justified on the basis of striking a better balance between:  
maximising the use of the Court of Appeal's limited resources so that it can focus on 
substantive cases that help shape legal jurisprudence and, at the same time, 
allowing it to continue to shape [Singapore] jurisprudence in the area of 
interlocutory applications.3 
Under the new three-pronged approach, to determine whether an order made on an 
interlocutory application was appealable to the Court of Appeal, one would have to 
determine which of the following three categories the order fell within: (1) non-appealable 
matters; (2) matters appealable only with leave of court; or (3) matters appealable as of right 
to the Court of Appeal.4 
                                                          
∗ LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore); LLM (Harvard University). The author would like to thank her 
supportive husband and family for providing the impetus and encouragement for the writing of this piece. 
1 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed). 
2 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (18 October 2010) vol 87 col 1367 (The Senior Minister of 
State for Law, Assoc Prof Ho Peng Kee). 
3 Id, at cols 1367–1395. 
4 Before these amendments, all orders made on interlocutory applications were appealable as of right to the Court 
of Appeal unless they were defined as non-appealable under s 34(1) of the Act or appealable only with leave of 
court under s 34(2) of the Act. These provisions stated as follows: 
34.—(1) No appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal in any of the following cases: 
(a) where a Judge makes an order giving unconditional leave to defend an action or an order 
setting aside unconditionally a default judgment; 
(b) except if the appellant is the defendant, where a Judge makes an order giving leave to defend 
on condition that the defendant pays into court or gives security for the sum claimed or an order 
setting aside a default judgment on condition as aforesaid; 
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Non-appealable matters are listed under the Fourth Schedule of the Act. Matters appealable 
only with leave of court are stated under s 34(2) of the Act, which makes reference to orders 
specified in the Fifth Schedule of the Act.5 The Fifth Schedule of the Act provides as follows: 
Except with the leave of a Judge, no appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal 
in any of the following cases: 
(a)  where a Judge makes an order refusing leave to amend a pleading, except if — 
(i) the application for such leave is made after the expiry of any relevant 
period of limitation current at the date of issue of the writ of summons; and 
(ii) the amendment is an amendment to correct the name of a party or to 
alter the capacity in which a party sues, or the effect of the amendment will be 
to add or substitute a new cause of action; 
(b)  where a Judge makes an order giving security for costs; 
(c)  where a Judge makes an order giving or refusing discovery or inspection of 
documents; 
(d) where a Judge makes an order refusing a stay of proceedings; 
(e)  where a Judge makes an order at the hearing of any interlocutory application 
other than an application for any of the following matters: 
(i) for summary judgment; 
(ii) to set aside a default judgment; 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(c) subject to any other provision in this section, where a Judge makes an interlocutory order in 
chambers unless the Judge has certified, on application within 7 days after the making of the 
order by any party for further argument in court, that he requires no further argument; 
(d) where the judgment or order is made by consent of the parties; or 
(e) where, by any written law for the time being in force, the judgment or order of the High Court 
is expressly declared to be final.  
(2) Except with the leave of the Court of Appeal or a Judge, no appeal shall be brought to the 
Court of Appeal in any of the following cases: 
(a) where the amount or value of the subject-matter at the trial is $250,000 or such other amount 
as may be specified by an order made under subsection (3) or less; 
(b) where the only issue in the appeal relates to costs or fees for hearing dates; 
(c) where a Judge in chambers makes a decision in a summary way on an interpleader summons 
where the facts are not in dispute; 
(d) an order refusing to strike out an action or a pleading or a part of a pleading; or 
(e) where the High Court makes an order in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction with respect to any 
proceedings under the Adoption of Children Act (Cap. 4) or under Part VII, VIII or IX of the Women’s Charter 
(Cap. 353). 
5 Section 34(2) of the Act reads as follows: 
(2)  Except with the leave of a Judge, no appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal in any of 
the following cases: 
(a) where the amount in dispute, or the value of the subject-matter, at the hearing before the High 
Court (excluding interest and costs) does not exceed $250,000 or such other amount as may be 
specified by an order made under subsection (3); 
(b) where the only issue in the appeal relates to costs or fees for hearing dates; 
(c) where a Judge in chambers makes a decision in a summary way on an interpleader summons 
where the facts are not in dispute; 
(d) where a Judge makes an order specified in the Fifth Schedule, except in such circumstances as 
may be specified in that Schedule; or 
 (e) where the High Court makes an order in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction with respect to any 
proceedings under the Adoption of Children Act (Cap. 4) or under Part VII, VIII or IX of the Women’s Charter 
(Cap. 353). 
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(iii) to strike out an action or a matter commenced by a writ of summons or 
by any other originating process, a pleading or a part of a pleading; 
(iv) to dismiss an action or a matter commenced by a writ of summons or by 
any other originating process; 
(v) for further and better particulars; 
(vi) for leave to amend a pleading; 
(vii) for security for costs; 
(viii) for discovery or inspection of documents; 
(ix) for interrogatories to be varied or withdrawn, or for leave to serve 
interrogatories; 
(x) for a stay of proceedings. 
Of particular note is sub-paragraph (e), which includes as a matter appealable only with 
leave of court, “an order at the hearing of any interlocutory application [emphasis added]” 
other than certain specified matters. Presumably, once the orders mentioned in the Fourth 
Schedule of the Act are taken out from the list of specified matters in sub-paragraph (e), 
what is left behind would be matters appealable as of right, such as orders for summary 
judgment, refusal to set aside a default judgment, striking out an action or defence, dismissal 
of action and a stay of proceedings.  
It would be apparent from this brief description that the definition of “interlocutory 
application” is crucial in order to understand whether a matter is appealable as of right or 
appealable only with leave of court. There is no confusion over whether a matter is non-
appealable because these are exhaustively listed in the Fourth Schedule. The recent 
Singapore Court of Appeal decision OpenNet Pte Ltd v Info-Communications Development 
Authority of Singapore6 (“OpenNet”) is the first Court of Appeal pronouncement on this 
subject and interprets the phrase “interlocutory application” in the Act. 
The issue before the Court of Appeal in OpenNet was whether the Appellant required leave to 
appeal against an order made by the High Court Judge refusing leave to the Appellant to 
commence judicial review proceedings.  
The Respondent argued, inter alia, that the Appellant required leave to appeal because the 
application for leave to commence judicial review was an “interlocutory application” under 
sub-paragraph (e) of the Fifth Schedule of the Act.7 According to the Respondent, an 
application for leave was “interlocutory” in nature because it was “simply a preliminary step 
to the substantive application for judicial review”;8 it may be made by ex parte originating 
summons without the Respondent being heard;9 and the Appellant had itself proceeded on 
the basis that the application was “interlocutory” in nature because its affidavits in support 
of the application for leave stated that they contained statements of information or belief, 
which were admissible under O 41 r 5 of the Rules of Court10 for “interlocutory 
proceedings”.11 
                                                          
6 [2013] SGCA 24. 
7 The Respondent relied on two other grounds but these did not form the ratio of the Court of Appeal’s decision. 
8 [2013] SGCA 24 at [11]. 
9 [2013] SGCA 24 at [11]. 
10 Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, Rev Ed 2006). 
11 [2013] SGCA 24 at [12]. 
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The Court of Appeal held that the Appellant’s subjective belief had no bearing on the proper 
interpretation of “interlocutory application” under the Act and focused on the crucial 
question of interpretation.12 It noted that the Act provided no definition for the phrase 
“interlocutory application” and that a plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase based on the 
definitions in various legal dictionaries would seem to exclude an application for leave to 
commence judicial review where there was no “main hearing determining the outcome of the 
case”.13 However, more importantly, a purposive reading in context led to the same 
conclusion.14 
The Court of Appeal discerned the purpose of the Act from the second reading speech of then 
Senior Minister of State for Law, Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee (“the Minister”), where 
the Minister had explained that under the new approach to be embodied in the Act, 
“[i]nterlocutory applications will now be categorised based on their importance to the 
substantive outcome of the case [emphasis added]” such that “[t]he right to appeal all the 
way to the Court of Appeal will … remain for interlocutory applications that could affect the 
final outcome of the case [emphasis added]”.15 This was so as to ensure that interlocutory 
applications, which usually do not involve novel or important points of law, were not 
unnecessarily taken all the way to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal also found that 
this view was clearly reflected in the Act itself, giving the examples of: (1) an application for 
summary judgment where no appeal was allowed to the Court of Appeal where the 
application was refused, but where no leave to appeal was required where summary 
judgment is ordered; and (2) an application to amend pleadings where no appeal may be 
brought to the Court of Appeal where leave to amend was granted but where leave to appeal 
may be obtained to appeal to the Court of Appeal where leave to amend was refused.16 
Applying this approach to an application for leave to commence judicial review, the Court of 
Appeal held that because the refusal of leave meant that there “was nothing more to proceed 
on” and that the “substantive rights of the parties had come to an absolute end unless there 
could be an appeal”, the application for leave to commence judicial review was not an 
“interlocutory application” under sub-paragraph (e) of the Fifth Schedule of the Act.17 
Accordingly, no leave to appeal was required before the Appellant filed an appeal against the 
decision of the High Court refusing leave to commence judicial review proceedings.  
With the amendments to the Act, the default position has shifted from one where all 
interlocutory applications (in the ordinary sense) were appealable as of right (save for the 
defined exceptions which were either non-appealable or appealable only with leave of the 
High Court or the Court of Appeal),18 to a situation where the default position for 
interlocutory applications is that they are appealable only with leave of the High Court (save 
for the defined exceptions which were non-appealable or appealable as of right).19 OpenNet 
has added another layer of nuance to this, by articulating the principle that interlocutory 
applications which “have the effect of finally disposing of the substantive rights of the 
parties” (i.e. “interlocutory applications” under sub-paragraph (e) of the Fifth Schedule) are 
                                                          
12 [2013] SGCA 24 at [13]. 
13 [2013] SGCA 24 at [14]. 
14 The purposive approach takes precedence in Singapore by virtue of s 9A(1) of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 
2002 Rev Ed), which provides that: “In the interpretation of a provision of a written law, an interpretation that 
would promote the purpose or object underlying the written law (whether that purpose or object is expressly 
stated in the written law or not) shall be preferred to an interpretation that would not promote that purpose or 
object.” 
15 [2013] SGCA 24 at [17] quoting Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (18 October 2010) vol 87 
cols 1367–1395. 
16 [2013] SGCA 24 at [19]–[20]. 
17 [2013] SGCA 24 at [21]. 
18 See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
19 See Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (18 October 2010) vol 87 cols 1367–1395 where the 
Minister stated that: “the default position is that all interlocutory applications are appealable to the Court of 
Appeal with leave”. 
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appealable as of right.20 This is to be welcome given that another reason for leave to appeal 
being undesirable is that the amendments to the Act further made the decision of the High 
Court in respect of an application for leave to appeal under s 34(2) of the Act final.21 
A step-by-step approach to determining whether leave to appeal is required for interlocutory 
applications not specifically mentioned in the Act after OpenNet would be as follows. First, 
one would ask if the application finally disposes of the substantive rights of the parties. If so, 
then there is no need for leave to appeal and an appeal may be brought to the Court of 
Appeal as of right. If not, then one must further consider if the application is non-appealable, 
i.e. whether it falls within the Fourth Schedule. If so, no appeal may be brought to the Court 
of Appeal. If not, then leave to appeal must be obtained from the High Court.   
Applying this approach to some interlocutory applications which are not specifically 
mentioned in the Act would produce the result that applications for reinstatement of an 
action that has been automatically discontinued, for renewal of a writ, for setting aside the 
service of an originating process, and for setting aside an order granting leave to withdraw, 
to name a few, would be appealable to the Court of Appeal as of right because such 
applications may have the effect of finally disposing of the substantive rights of the parties. 
Where any of these applications are refused, the effect would be to bring an action to an end 
unless there is an appeal.  
However, if these applications were analysed on an individual basis, the justification for 
permitting an automatic right to the Court of Appeal in the light of the aim of reducing 
unnecessary appeals to the Court of Appeal may be weak. Let us take the application for 
reinstatement of an action that has been automatically discontinued as an example. Under O 
21 r 2(6) of the Rules of Court,22 if no party to an action has, for more than one year taken 
any step or proceeding in the action that appears from records maintained by the Court (and 
there is no extension of time sought before one year has elapsed), the action is deemed to 
have been discontinued. This tool is an important one to ensure that parties proceed 
expeditiously with the cases in court. If a High Court Registrar refuses the application for 
reinstatement and so does the High Court, it is difficult to imagine in what circumstances it 
would be a good use of judicial time and resources for the Court of Appeal to have to deal 
with this matter.   
Therefore, although the clarification of the Court of Appeal in OpenNet is welcome, the 
drafters of the Act may wish to monitor the situation to see if the aims of the amendments 
are met for the vast majority of cases. As observed by the Minister, “the categorisation [in the 
Act] is not cast in stone but can be amended if the need arises in the future”.23 
A review may be particularly appropriate in the light of recent changes to the appeal practice 
that will see an increase in the workload of the judges of the Court of Appeal in the area of 
case management.24 Pursuant to Supreme Court Practice Directions (Amendment No 1 of 
2013), a new practice has been instituted whereby each party to a civil appeal will have to file 
an information sheet related to the appeal, and may also be required to attend before the 
Court to take directions on the conduct of the appeal.25 The amendments to the Practice 
Directions also introduced page limits for the Appellant’s Case and Respondent’s Case for 
                                                          
20 [2013] SGCA 24 at [18]. 
21 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed), s 34(2B). 
22 Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, Rev Ed 2006). 
23 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (18 October 2010) vol 87 cols 1367–1395. 
24 See Response by Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, Opening of the Legal Year 2013 and Welcome Reference for 
the Chief Justice (4 January 2013) at para 32, available online: <http://app.lsc.gov.sg/data/OLY%202013%20-
%20CJ%20Speech%20OLY%20Welcome%20Reference.pdf> (last accessed 30 March 2013). 
25 See Supreme Court Practice Directions (Amendment No 1 of 2013), available online: 
<http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.aspx?pgID=4601> (last accessed 30 March 2013). 
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civil appeals to the Court of Appeal, and judges of the Court of Appeal may have to deal with 
requests for leave to exceed the stipulated page limit.26 
Another significant change in the case management practice of the Supreme Court of 
Singapore – shifting “to a modified docket system of litigation”27 – further strengthens the 
need for a review. Under this modified docket system, it is contemplated that Judges and 
Registrars will be assigned at an early stage to specific cases and that the Judges will be 
involved in dealing with the interlocutory processes along the way.28 As it is likely that a 
docketed Registrar may work closely with the docketed Judge on case management and 
dealing with interlocutory applications, the need for a further tier of appeal for interlocutory 
applications to the Court of Appeal, or at least an avenue for leave to appeal to be sought 
from the Court of Appeal, may be required in order to retain independent oversight for 
certain types of interlocutory applications that may not finally dispose of the substantive 
rights of the parties but would nevertheless have an important impact on the outcome of the 
case. Examples of these may be interlocutory injunctions, discovery applications and 
applications relating to further and better particulars. 
Further, it may be worthwhile considering whether the framework for determining whether a 
matter is appealable to the Court of Appeal in the Act may be simplified to enable the 
ordinary man in the street to understand and apply the law. The current framework although 
comprehensive, is cumbersome in that it requires reference to s 34(1)–(2) of the Act, which 
then in turn refers to the Fourth Schedule and the Fifth Schedule, with the Fifth Schedule 
containing a broad catch-all category in sub-paragraph (e) with its own exceptions. 
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